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The Current Medical Liability Insurance Crisis:
An Overview of the Problem, Its
Catalysts and Solutions
Introduction by Christina 0. Jackiw*
I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Barry R. Furrow gave the keynote speech at the Loyola
University Chicago Institute for Health Law Annual Health Law and Policy
Colloquium held in Chicago on November 14, 2003. Professor Furrow
completed his undergraduate degree at Harvard College in 1967. Soon
afterwards, he entered Harvard Law School where he received his law
degree in 1971.
After doing a clerkship and working at a Boston law firm, Professor
Furrow began teaching in law school. Since then, he has taught at the law
schools of American University, George Mason University, the University
of Detroit, the University of Michigan, and the University of North
Carolina. In 1995, Professor Furrow received the Jay Healey Distinguished
Health Law Teacher Award from the Health Law Section of the American
Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics. In the spring of 1998, he was the
Merck Visiting Scholar at Seton Hall Law School. Currently, he is a law
professor and director of the Health Law Institute at Widener University
School of Law. To date, Professor Furrow has published over four-dozen
articles in various legal and health journals and is the lead author of the
most widely used health law textbook.
Professor David A. Hyman offered a response to Professor Furrow's
keynote speech. Professor Hyman received his undergraduate, law, and
medical degrees from the University of Chicago in 1983, 1989, and 1991,
respectively. Professor Hyman is a member of the Illinois and the District
of Columbia bars and is licensed to appear before the 6th, 7th, and 10th
Circuit Courts of Appeals and the United States Tax Court.
Professor Hyman began his teaching career in 1994 at the University of
Maryland School of Law, where he continues to teach today. He has also
* Student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, class of 2004.
member of the Annals ofHealth Law.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

Ms. Jackiw is a

1

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 8

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 13

taught as a visiting professor at the law schools of George Washington
University and University of Texas. In addition to teaching, Professor
Hyman serves as Special Counsel to the Federal Trade Commission and is
an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute. Professor Hyman has published
numerous articles on a variety of topics, but is primarily interested in the
areas of healthcare financing and delivery regulation and empirical law and
economics.
In his keynote speech, Professor Furrow provided a view of the big
picture-the medical malpractice insurance crisis, its causes, and proposed
solutions.
Professor Hyman's response provided more insight into
healthcare quality and solutions to the crisis. These topics will be addressed
in turn.
II. WHAT Is ALL THE CLAMOR ABOUT?

National news alarms went off when, in early 2003, thousands of doctors
from various specialties closed their practice doors and joined together in
protest against skyrocketing medical malpractice insurance premiums.'
Among the physicians' chief complaints were that astronomical premiums
were causing some of them to leave certain states and others to close up

shop altogether. 2 They called for tort reform, in the shape of caps on noneconomic damages, as a means of lowering their insurance costs. 3 Of
course, these rallies across the country did not mark the beginning of the
current medical malpractice insurance crisis, but helped bring the issue to
the forefront of national news.
So, how high did these premiums go? In 2003, many states witnessed
insurance premiums rising by more than twenty-five percent.4 For example,
internists' rates jumped thirty percent in Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, and
Oklahoma; between forty and fifty-five percent in Connecticut, Missouri,
New Jersey, New Mexico, and Tennessee; and an alarming 139% in
Virginia.
In dollar amounts, among the highest premiums paid by
internists in 2003 were $65,697 in Miami, Florida; $50,063 in Detroit,
Michigan; $41,238 in Chicago, Illinois; $34,346 in Houston, Texas; and
$29,667 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.6
Other specialties have received even bigger blows, particularly general

1.
2.

Jennifer Barrett, How to Fix the Medical Liability System,
Id.

NEWSWEEK,

Feb. 6, 2003.

3. Id.
4.

Berkeley Rice, How High Now? Premium Hikes of 25 Percent or More Are Now

Common, with More Double-DigitIncreasesExpectedfor 2004, MED. ECON., Jan. 9, 2004.

5.
6.

Id.(quoting Medical Liability Monitor study).
Id (quoting Medical Liability Monitor study).
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surgery and obstetrics and gynecology.7 In 2003, the five highest premiums
for general surgeons ranged from $98,319 in the Chicago metropolitan area
8
to $226,542 in the Miami metropolitan area. However, insurance rates for
obstetricians and gynecologists created the most sticker shock, with the five
highest rates ranging from $141,704 in Las Vegas, Nevada to an
9
astonishing $249,196 in Miami, Florida.
Much to everyone's dismay, many insurance companies have announced
that they will continue to raise their rates in 2004, even in states that were
not significantly affected in 2003.10 These companies predicted that again,
there seems to be
the increases would be in the double digits." Therefore,
2
future.1
near
the
in
not
no impending relief, at least
Higher insurance premiums are not the only cause for concern,
however.' 3 Many physicians are facing stricter eligibility criteria, cutbacks
in coverage, policy cancellations, or, most significantly, complete lack of
available coverage. 14 For instance, twenty out of the forty insurance carriers
15
in Florida have withdrawn from the market in the last ten years.
Similarly, three insurance carriers in New Jersey, providing coverage for
fifty-five percent of the physicians in the state, discontinued their
malpractice lines in less than one year.' 6 In Pennsylvania and Washington,
the states' largest malpractice insurance providers have been forced into
17
liquidation and receivership, respectively. The worst upset of all, however,
came when the largest malpractice insurer in the country, The St. Paul
Companies, declared in December of 2001 its plan to discontinue its
sending shockwaves and affecting
services to the medical community,
18
country.
entire
the
across
doctors
The lack of affordability and in some cases, complete unavailability, of
7. Id. (quoting Medical Liability Monitor study).
8. Id. (quoting Medical Liability Monitor study).
9. Id. (quoting Medical Liability Monitor study).
10. Rice, supra note 4 (citing Medical Liability Monitor study).
11. Id. (citing Medical Liability Monitor study).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14.

Id.

15.

JOINT ECON. COMM., 108TH CONG., LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: ISSUES

AND EVIDENCE 15

16.
17.
18.

(Comm. Study 2003).

Id. at 16.
Id.

MIMI MARCHEV, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY,
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS: OPPORTUNITY FOR STATE ACTION 6 (July

at http://www.nashp.org; U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.

THE

MEDICAL

2002), available
(HHS), CONFRONTING

THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS
BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM 14 (July 2002), available at http://

www.aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/litrefm.htm.
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medical malpractice insurance has created new barriers for patients in
obtaining much needed medical care.' 9 For example, in Nevada, the
University of Nevada Medical Center closed its Las Vegas Level One
trauma center for ten days in July of 2002 because its surgeons quit after
not being able to afford their insurance premiums, some of which rose from
$40,000 to $200,000 per year.20 This posed an enormous access threat to
emergency care since the next closest trauma center is located five hours
away. 21 Likewise, in Pennsylvania, Frankford Hospital's twelve orthopedic
surgeons all resigned in 2001 when their premiums almost doubled to
$106,000 per year.22 Furthermore, community hospitals in rural counties of
West Virginia shut down their obstetric facilities because their obstetricians
23
could not keep up with rising insurance Costs.
Worst of all, doctors who used to volunteer at medical clinics for the
poor or at the Medical Reserve Corps have curbed their services because
they have no malpractice insurance coverage.24 This, of course, has posed
extraordinary challenges in providing care to low-income patients and has
placed a massive financial burden on the clinics which, in order to continue
providing services, must obtain their own insurance coverage.
Other
states, such as Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia have also witnessed the sharp
insurance increases causing an exodus of physicians from the states, early
retirement of physicians, and the curtailment of certain high-risk
procedures. 26 Consequently, certain facilities have closed, further impeding
patients' access to medical care.27
Based on the growing threats of medical malpractice insurance
unaffordability and unavailability and healthcare inaccessibility, in July
2003, the American Medical Association designated nineteen states to be
suffering from a full-scale medical liability "crisis. ,,28 In addition, it placed
twenty-five states and the District of Columbia in the category of "states

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

HHS, supra note 18, at 2.
Id.; JOINTECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 15-16.
HHS, supranote 18, at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 3-4; JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 15-17.
HHS, supranote 18, at 3-4; JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 15-17.
28. AM. MED. Ass'N (AMA), AMERICA'S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRIsIs: A NATIONAL VIEW
(July 2003) (designating Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
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showing problem signs. 2 9 Only six states were deemed to be "currently
okay."30 Therefore, all the clamor is a reaction to a real problem wreaking
havoc on this country's healthcare community.
III. THE CATALYSTS
There seems to be no doubt nor debate that the American healthcare
industry is presently undergoing a medical malpractice insurance crisis.
What remains in passionate dispute between the many players involved,
however, is what in fact has caused this crisis.3 1 A National Academy for
State Health Policy report aptly sums up the various arguments:
Insurers and doctors blame "predatory' trial attorneys, "frivolous"
lawsuits, and "out of control" juries for the spike in insurance premiums.
In turn, consumer groups accuse insurance companies of "price gouging,"
while plaintiffs' attorneys point to an exorbitant rate of medical errors
to deter malpractice and provide compensation to injured
and the 3need
2
patients.

In his speech, Professor Furrow addressed these theories and provided
his explanation for the current medical malpractice insurance crisis.
Patients have often been charged with triggering the malpractice liability
crisis because of their excessive litigiousness.33 Professor Furrow dispelled
this theory. He indicated that although more people file claims than
actually have valid ones, there are many more injured victims of negligence
than actually file suit for negligence.34 This means that many real victims
of medical malpractice never file claims.35 Furthermore, Professor Furrow
indicated that there is not much data showing an explosion in tort
36
Lastly, although judgments are becoming increasingly large,
litigation.
Professor Furrow noted that the figures are not at all conclusive on this
point.3 7 Therefore, due to the lack of definitive research on the frequency
29. Id. (designating Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia).
30. Id. (designating California, Colorado, Indiana, Louisiana, New Mexico, and
Wisconsin).
31. MARCHEV, supra note 18, at 1.
32. Id.
33. INS. INFO. INST., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 5 (2003).
34. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 3.
35. MARCHEV, supra note 18, at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id. According to Jury Verdict Research, the median jury award doubled from
$500,000 to $1,000,000 between 1995 and 2001. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 33, at 16
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and severity of claims, it is inappropriate to blame patients for fueling the
current crisis.
Trial lawyers have also been targeted for causing the crisis because,
among other things, they exploit the broken tort system and file frivolous
lawsuits. 38 Again, Professor Furrow dismissed this claim. Professor
Furrow's reasoning was that the tort system, in its current state, under
compensates victims of negligent injury.39 Only about half of the claimants
who file complaints actually receive any compensation.4 0 Furthermore, he
noted that it is entirely unclear whether the tort system actually deters
physicians from acting negligently. 4 1 Finally, Professor Furrow indicated
that medical malpractice claims are very difficult to bring because they are
very costly and are always faced with fierce defenses. Thus, such realities
of the tort system and the litigation process pose significant challenges to
trial lawyers, removing the luxury of filing every claim that comes their
way but requiring close scrutiny of all claims for merit and viability.
Although Professor Furrow dismissed certain theories of culpability, he
did find merit in others. Therefore, according to Professor Furrow, there
are three main forces that have contributed to the current medical liability
crisis: (a) medical error, (b) the insurance industry cycle, and (c) inflation of
healthcare costs.
A. Medical Error
Professors Furrow and Hyman agreed that medical error is one of the
major catalysts of today's medical malpractice insurance crisis. In a 2000
report, the Institute of Medicine announced that between 44,000 and 98,000
American patients die each year due to medical error. 42 Both the high and
low estimates place medical error on the list of the top ten causes of death
in the United States for 1997, alongside well-known killers such as heart
disease (726,974 deaths), cancer (539,577 deaths), cerebrovascular disease
(citing Jury Verdict Research data). Another figure, provided by the Center for Justice and
Democracy, shows that the average plaintiff's award is $30,000 and has been such for the
last ten years. CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, A SHORT GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
TODAY'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE "CRISIS"

12 (2002) (citing data from a 2001

Consumer Federation of America study). The Congressional Budget Office offered yet
another figure that the average medical malpractice claim payout increased from $95,000 in

1986 to $320,000 in 2002.

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LIMITING TORT LIABILITY FOR MEDICAL

(Jan. 2004) (citing data from Physician Insurers Association of America),
availableat http://www.cbo.gov.
38. MARCHEV, supra note 18, at 1.
39. HHS, supra note 18, at 8; JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 1.
40. HHS, supra note 18, at 1;JOINTECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 10.
41. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 1.
42. INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN 26 (Linda T. Kohn et. al. eds., 2000).
MALPRACTICE
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(159,791 deaths), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (109,029 deaths),
diabetes (62,636 deaths), suicide (30,535 deaths), and nephritis (25,331
deaths).43
Fortunately, not all medical errors result in death. Nevertheless, they do
cause injury to the patient. According to the Harvard Medical Practice
Study, which examined hospitals in New York State in 1984, 2.1% of all
hospitalized patients were injured due to medical error, causing disability or
extended hospital stay. 44 The predominant types of medical errors that
occurred were errors in surgery or procedure (35%), failure to take
preventive measures (22%), misdiagnosis (14%), and inappropriate drug
treatment (9%).45 The Colorado-Utah study, which investigated hospitals in
Colorado and Utah in 1992, echoed the earlier study's findings.46 There
1.9% of all hospitalized patients suffered from injuries due to medical error,
causing disability or lengthened hospital stay.47 Although most of those
iatrogenic injuries were temporary (78%), 7% of them did indeed result in
death.48
Professor Furrow stressed that medical errors associated with drug
treatment are on the rise due to increased dependence on drug therapy.49
Between 1983 and 1993, the number of deaths in hospitals due to
medication errors jumped from 2876 to 7391.50 Furthermore, in 1993, there
were 8.48 times as many deaths in outpatient facilities as a result of
medication errors as in 1983.51
Not surprisingly, medical error translates into additional costs to the
healthcare system and society as a whole. 52 These costs include healthcare
costs associated with correcting the error and providing appropriate care for
the injured patient, disability costs, and loss of productivity costs, such as
lost income and lost household production.53 The estimated national cost of
medical error is seventeen billion dollars per year.54 This cost, in turn, is
reflected in medical malpractice litigation, driving up the dollar amounts of
43.

& DOUGLAS
A CHARTBOOK 61 (2002).

SHEILA LEATHERMAN

UNITED STATES:

MCCARTHY, QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN THE

44.
45.
46.

Id. at 62 (citing Harvard Medical Practice Study).
Id.

47.

LEATHERMAN

INST. OF MED.,

supra note 42, at 30.
& MCCARTHY, supra note 43, at 63 (citing Harvard Medical Practice

Study).
48. Id.

49.

INST. OF MED., supra note

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at41.
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claims and their payouts and consequently, causing malpractice insurance
premiums to rise.
B. The Insurance Industry Cycle
Another chief contributor to the current medical liability crisis, as
discussed by Professor Furrow, is the cyclical nature of the insurance
industry. The purpose of medical malpractice insurance is to cover the
defense costs and damages imposed in a negligence case. 5 Due to the risks
of practicing medicine, practically all healthcare providers purchase such
insurance. 6 The typical policy held by a physician offers one million
dollars of coverage for each incident and a maximum of three million
dollars of coverage per year. 57 To ensure coverage in the event of a
malpractice claim, the healthcare provider pays a premium to the insurer. 8
The insurer, in turn, invests the premium in the bond and stock markets. 9
In this way, the insurance cycle begins.
An accurate description of the insurance cycle was offered by the
National Academy for State Health Policy:
Insurance underwriting practices are cyclical with periodic adjusting of
rates after the fact to reflect actual losses during a given period. The
premiums are invested and the return on investment is factored in as part
of a company's profits and losses. During times of high interest rates or a
strong stock market, insurance companies keep their premiums low in
order to remain competitive, increase their market share, and acquire
revenue to invest. This is possible because their income is augmented
from the high rate of return on investments. A downturn in the stock
market or a drop in interest rates results in a lower rate of return on
investments and leads to an increase in premiums.
After premium increases in the 1970s and again in the 1980s, the medical
malpractice market remained stable through the economic boom years of
the 1990s. During this period, medical liability insurance was one of the
most profitable lines in the industry, and new companies entered the
market enticing customers with bargain rates. This price war for new
customers prompted many insurers to sell malpractice coverage at rates

55.
56.

JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 3.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM

RATES 6 (June 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov.

57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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too low to cover the costs of subsequent claims. When the boom stock
market went bust, exacerbated by the September 11th terrorist attacks,
many of these companies suffered large losses and either went out of
business, drastically 6raised
premiums, or stopped offering medical
0
malpractice insurance.
As Professor Furrow noted, there is one telltale sign that a crisis is
underway-a decline of medical malpractice insurance carriers' profits.
Between 1990 and 2001, these insurance companies experienced a
consistent drop in their net profits, from 17.4% to -4.7% as a percentage of
their net worth. 61 The most dramatic plunge occurred between 2000 and
2001, where net profits transformed into net losses, from 5.4% to -4.7% of
net worth.62
These insurance losses, coupled with rising premiums, have put the
insurance cycle into a downward plunge and have caused another medical
malpractice insurance crisis to emerge.63 The current crisis is the third of its
kind in the last thirty years, following the first in the 1970s and the second
in the 1980s. 64 Just as today's crisis, the first two crises surfaced almost
concurrently with the downturn of the insurance cycle.6 5 Thus, this pattern
of insurance cycle lows followed by medical malpractice crises clearly
demonstrates that the insurance industry cycle is again a major force behind
the current medical malpractice insurance crisis.
C. Inflation of HealthcareCosts
According to Professor Furrow, the third main cause for the current
malpractice crisis is the rising cost of healthcare. The United States
Department of Health and Human Services announced that in 2001, 1.4
trillion dollars were spent on healthcare in the United States.6 6 That amount
of spending accounted for 14.1% of the gross domestic product of the
United States.67 Furthermore, it is estimated that by the year 2012,
healthcare expenditures will make up 17.7% of the country's gross
domestic product. 68 These figures demonstrate that healthcare is a huge

60.
61.
62.

MARCHEV,

63.

AMS.

supra note 18, at 6.
GAO, supra note 56, at 29.
Id.
FOR

INS.

REFORM

(AIR),

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

INSURANCE:

STABLE

LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 4 (2002); MARCHEV, supra note 18, at 6.
64. Id.
65. MARCHEV, supra note 18, at 6.
66. INS. INFO. INST., supra note 33, at 16 (citing HHS).
67. Id. at 17 (citing HHS).
68. Id.
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player in the nation's economy. Consequently, rising healthcare costs drive
up the amounts of medical malpractice claims and awards, which reflect
current costs of medical care.69 In fact, according to Americans for
Insurance Reform, malpractice judgments have increased at approximately
the same rate as medical inflation. 70 Therefore, soaring healthcare costs
also contribute to the medical liability crisis by imposing higher judgment
payouts on medical malpractice insurers who then react by raising their
premiums.
IV. THE SOLUTIONS: MORE THAN JUST TORT REFORM
Solutions to the medical malpractice insurance problem are another area
subject to hot debate. 7 1 Again, the report by the National Academy for
State Health Policy provides the best synopsis of the different perspectives:
Insurers and physicians demand tort reform, changes in the legal system
that will limit the frequency of litigation and the amount of damage
awards. Attorneys argue that past legal reform has unfairly blocked
victims' access to the courts while doing nothing to bring down the costs
of malpractice insurance. They see the solution in regulation of the
insurance industry. Patient advocates focus on safety and suggest
mandatory reporting
of medical errors and no-fault approach to victim
72
compensation.
As Professor Furrow indicated, there is no single magic solution to this
complex problem. 73 Rather, he offered various suggestions that can be used
in conjunction with each other as a means of bringing relief 74 The majority
of solutions he addressed can be divided into three main categories: (a) tort
reform, (b) insurance market stabilization, and (c) patient safety.
A. Tort Reform
The main objectives of tort reform are to restrict the amount of claims
brought and to limit the dollar amounts ofjudgments.75 Presently, Congress
is considering a federal bill which aims to restructure the entire medical
liability system on a federal level.76 The House of Representatives passed

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

AIR, supra note 63, at 4.
Id.
MARCHEV, supra note 18, at 9.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at9.
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 19.
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the bill in March 2003, but the Senate postponed its vote when it last
revisited the issue in July 2003. 77 The proposed bill contains numerous
provisions. 7' First, it proposes to set no limits on economic damages
amounts awarded to medical malpractice plaintiffs, maintaining the law as
it stands today. 79 However, non-economic losses, such as pain and
suffering, would be restricted to a maximum award of $250,000.80
Similarly, punitive damages would only be awarded in cases where the
plaintiff can prove intentional wrongdoing and would be limited to
$250,000 or two times the amount of economic damages, whichever is
more. 8 Attorneys' contingency fees would also be restricted to a certain
percentage of the total award, ranging from forty percent for the first
$50,000 to fifteen percent for all awards over $600,000.82 Further, the bill
establishes a universal statute of limitations with certain exceptions granted
to minors, requiring plaintiffs to bring medical malpractice lawsuits within
three years of their injury or one year after they discover, or should have
discovered, their injury. 3 The proposed legislation creates a fair share rule,
allocating liability to each defendant commensurate with his/her share of
fault. 84 This concept abolishes joint and several liability where a defendant
may be obligated to pay the full amount of damages notwithstanding how
much he/she actually contributed to the injury. 85 In addition, the bill allows
evidence of collateral sources at trial, thereby limiting plaintiffs to
collecting damages from only one source.86 Finally, the proposed
legislation allows for future losses to be paid over time as opposed to
requiring one instant lump-sum payment of all damages.87
While Professor Furrow did suggest certain steps that could be taken by
the federal government, such as funding demonstration projects and
enforcing healthcare quality, he did not recommend a federal overhaul of
the tort system. He noted that since the crisis hits harder in certain areas,
the states are closer to the problem and can provide solutions on a more
localized level.

77.

2003: Year in Review: The Stories That Shaped and Shook Healthcare, MOD.

HEALTHCARE,

78.
79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

84.

Dec. 22, 2003.

JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note
JOINTECON. COMM., supra note
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note

15, at 19.

15, at 20; HHS, supra note 18, at 19.
15, at 20; HHS, supra note 18, at 19.

15,
15,
15,
JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15,

at 20; HHS, supra note 18, at 19.
at 20.
at 20; HHS, supra note 18, at 19.
at 20; HHS, supra note 18, at 19.

85.

JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 15, at 20; HHS, supra note 18, at 19.

86.

JOINT ECON.

87.

JOINT ECON. COMM.,

COMM.,
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After the first two medical liability crises in the 1970s and the 1980s,
several states passed various tort reform measures in an effort to cool down
the crises.88 However, there is no conclusive answer to the question of
whether those measures yielded the intended effects of decreasing the
frequency and severity of claims. 89 For example, Professor Furrow noted
that in Indiana, where caps were instituted, plaintiffs' awards actually grew.
Similarly, a study in Wyoming revealed that the tort reforms instituted there
had a negligible effect on both the frequency of malpractice claims and
award amounts. 90
Nonetheless, states are continuing to explore the possibility of further
tort reform. 91 Many states are proposing similar provisions to the ones in
the pending federal bill discussed above. Among the different measures
considered are caps on non-economic damages, sovereign immunity caps
for public hospitals and public healthcare employees, abolition of the
collateral source rule which bans multiple recoveries for the same injury,
tightening expert witness rules, elimination of joint and several liability,
limiting attorney contingency fees, and shortening statute of limitations
periods.92 Therefore, those states that are concerned with the tort system
and the medical malpractice litigation process itself have a host of options
from which to choose in designing a plan of recourse to the malpractice
problem.
B. InsuranceMarket Stabilization
Another set of measures proposed by Professor Furrow targets the
insurance industry in an effort to stabilize it. One such measure is creating
Joint Underwriting Associations which serve as a temporary patch when the
insurance cycle hits its bottom. 93 Joint Underwriting Associations are
conglomerates of insurance carriers, sponsored by individual states, which
offer insurance in times of insurance coverage shortages.94 The benefits of
such a measure are that the risk is spread among all the insurance
companies in the association and it provides otherwise unobtainable
coverage.95 The downside, however, is that such coverage may be more
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costly than a traditional medical malpractice policy because it is only
available in emergent situations.96
Another measure suggested by Professor Furrow is heightened regulation
of the insurance industry. Currently, the federal government does not
oversee nor regulate the insurance industry in any way. 97 Moreover, the
individual states' regulatory efforts have proved to be insufficient and
virtually no requirements for data disclosure are in place.98 Therefore,
Professor Furrow called for provisions mandating the disclosure of risk data
and imposing sanctions for noncompliance. Further, he stressed the need
for insurance rate regulation to prevent future cyclical downtums. 99 Finally,
Professor Furrow proposed provisions which would require insurers to
notify their insureds about renewal rates and non-renewal decisions in order
to give physicians the opportunity to secure alternative coverage.
There are, of course, other measures aimed at stabilizing the insurance
industry. l00 States can offer stop-gap coverage in which they create their
own insurance funds to provide physicians with coverage in times of
insurance shortage.' 0 1 Although such a measure tends to be expensive and
may potentially put a state into the position of being the only provider of
coverage, it helps alleviate the crisis in the short-term. 10 2 Also, states can
establish patient compensation funds which subsidize the portion of a
plaintiff's award exceeding a certain amount, for example, $200,000 per
occurrence and $600,000 per year. 10 3 Financing of such a fund would come
1 °4
through a yearly surcharge on participating healthcare providers.
Another possible strategy is for states to subsidize physicians' insurance
premiums during times of crisis. 0 5 Even though subsidies do not solve the
underlying problem of rising premiums, they pose little challenges in the
legislative process and are easy to administer. 10 6 Thus, there are several
remedies to which states can turn in an attempt to better control the
insurance industry and ensure the availability and affordability of insurance
coverage to the healthcare community, thereby eliminating the prospects of
another malpractice liability crisis.
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C. PatientSafety
The last possible solution to the medical malpractice insurance crisis is
increased attention to patient safety, as recommended by both Professors
Furrow and Hyman. At a time when death and injury due to medical error
are alarmingly high, certain safeguards should be put into place in an effort
to put a halt to them. 0 7 By enacting measures aimed at improving the
quality and safety of patient care, incidences of medical error will decline,
decreasing the number of lawsuits, and subsequently, lowering malpractice
insurance premiums. 08
To further patient safety, Professor Furrow recommended that states
promulgate error disclosure mandates, requiring healthcare providers to
disclose all medical errors and near misses, offering whistleblower
protection, and administering sanctions for noncompliance. At the moment,
approximately twenty states mandate error reporting. 0 9 These states have
discovered that the increase in reporting has resulted in the better
identification and solution of problems, which eventually translate into
higher quality of care. 10
Both Professors Furrow and Hyman proposed another innovative
approach to achieving higher levels of patient safety-structuring
compensation of healthcare providers based on the quality of care they
provide to their patients. Professor Hyman indicated that the healthcare
industry, in its present state, provides the same amount of compensation to
healthcare providers, regardless of the quality of their care. In comparison,
all other industries reward their workers based on the quality of their end
product. Therefore, the Professors proposed a tiered compensation system
based on healthcare providers' performance, which would arguably give
incentive to providers to administer the best care possible.
States may also consider a host of other possible patient safety measures
in their quest for better healthcare quality."' For instance, they can enact
provisions empowering their state medical and licensing boards to regulate
12
healthcare professionals more closely, requiring a higher level of quality."
Unfortunately, under the current state structures, these boards maintain that
"they can only perform their mission if they are properly organized,
effectively empowered, and adequately funded."''" Furthermore, states can
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encourage further disclosure of adverse events, licensure issues, and
medical malpractice insurance payment history to the National Practitioner
Data Bank, created by Congress in an effort to facilitate the hiring and
licensing process of healthcare providers.' 1 4 Another tactic is for states to
provide healthcare providers, particularly those practicing in high-risk
specialties such as obstetrics and gynecology, emergency medicine, or
anesthesia, with current medical guidelines outlining practice and risk
management protocols." 5 If providers follow such guidelines, they will be
afforded an affirmative defense against negligence claims." 6 Finally, states
can establish patient safety centers for the collection of medical error data,
the development of strategic solutions to the problem, dissemination of
information to patients, and the provision of training and educational
materials to healthcare providers. 117 Therefore, at a time when medical
error has climbed to alarmingly high numbers, states can implement various
measures to improve the quality of medical care, which will simultaneously
aid in extinguishing the current medical malpractice insurance crisis by
generating less negligence claims and judgments.
V. CONCLUSION

In summary, there is no question that the nation is undergoing another
medical malpractice insurance crisis. Coping with losses, insurance
companies have been radically raising their insurance premiums, dropping
their medical malpractice insurance lines, or simply going out of business
altogether. In turn, high premiums and lack of coverage have driven several
doctors to relocate to different states, retire prematurely, or cut back on
much needed services. According to Professor Furrow, the three major
catalysts of the current crisis are high incidences of medical error, the
insurance industry cycle, and healthcare cost inflation. As for alleviating
the problem, Professor Furrow stresses enacting measures to promote
patient safety, further regulating the insurance industry, and of course,
looking at tort reform. Professor Hyman highlights the importance of
quality and safe medical care and proposes a compensation system based on
the quality of care administered to the patient.
At this point, we have heard most of the clamor, debate and
disagreement. The time is now ripe to look forward and find long-term
solutions to this devastating problem so as not to revisit this topic again in
the next ten years.
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